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NOTE ON PRONOUN USAGE
At the time of this writing, the use of masculine pronouns when referring to
unspecified individuals has been discredited, but no alternative has been widely agreed
upon. For the purposes of this thesis, plurals, passive voice or combined pronouns
could be confusing. Therefore, the thesis employs an emerging convention found in
some of the literature surveyed. Unspecified individuals will sometimes be male,
sometimes female. There will be continuity within each example. In a given example
or line of thought the unspecified individual will be referred to as he, while in another
the individual will be referred to as she.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTROL

"Life is a relentless pursuit for control" (Wong, 1992, p. 143). From our first
days as infants, our development is linked to learning that our actions have
consequences. We cry and an adult comes to care for us; we shake our bodies and a
toy makes noise. Childhood, and particularly adolescence, becomes a push for more
and more personal freedom from authority figures. In our adult lives we strive for
power in our careers, personal relationships and social interactions. As we grow older
maintaining control becomes more and more difficult, and yet, may contribute to
prolonging our lives. "Across the life span, every significant developmental transition
provides new challenges for perceived and actual control" (Rodin, 1990, p. 11 ).
Unless we have some perception of control over our own lives, whether that
perception is accurate or not, we are reduced to the basic level of survival. DeCharms
(1968) wrote that "man's primary motivational propensity is to be effective in
producing changes in his environment. Man strives to be a causal agent. His nature
commits him to this path and his very life depends on it" (p. 269).
Many of us spend much of our time in power struggles, living with a level of
stress which eventually begins to erode our health. If we become sick or fall victim to
crime or accident, we search for meaning as a way to repair the perception of loss of
control. On another level, cultural and gender differences in attitudes toward control
make understanding each other difficult. Nations plunge their citizens into wars over
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power and control, and Wong (1992) states, "The theme of control in all its variations
permeates every aspect of the real life drama" (p. 147).
In his book, The Denial of Death, Becker (1973) described the existential terror
people feel living in a frighteningly uncertain world. He argued that we attempt to
cope with that terror on a day-to-day basis by creating positive, life-affirming
illusions. In other words, in instances where we find we cannot directly control our
environment, we may still feel compelled to attempt some measure of control through
our cognitions.
Rothbaum, Weisz and Snyder (1982) suggest that persons value control so
highly, they very rarely abandon the quest for it. The authors point out that most early
theories of perceived control, especially learned helplessness and locus of control
theories, look only at what they call primary control, attempts to change the world so
that it satisfies the self's needs. When attempts at primary control fail, the authors
suggest that, rather than giving up, we may switch to a process they call secondary
control. The inward behaviors of passivity, withdrawal and submissiveness, which
other theorists believe reflect relinquished control, more often seem to these authors to
be attempts to sustain a perception of control by adjusting our inner worlds in order to
fit more comfortably into the outside world we have been unable to change.
Personal control is almost unique in being a concept which refers to the
relationship between a person and his or her world (Syme, 1990). The concept of
control is being studied by not only clinical, educational, social and industrial
psychologists, but medical practitioners, philosophers, sociologists, theologians. etc.
One result of this is that there has been a proliferation of concepts about control which
include:
locus of control beliefs, locus of causality, desired control, participatory control,
shared control, primary and secondary control, contingency judgments, self-
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efficacy, mastery, competence, power motive, autonomy, freedom,
responsibility, psychological reactance, learned helplessness, mindfulness and
mindlessness, and the illusion of control. (Wong, 1992, p. 144)
At this point there does not appear to be one theory of control which can handle
every aspect of this important concept. Despite this fact, however, there are
compelling reasons to investigate perceived control. Recent research has shown that
having control is not always, as previously thought, beneficial, and the perception that
we have control may be more important than the actuality of having it. Rodin (1990)
wrote that "judgments of personal control not only influence how people operate in
various activities but also determine which activities and environments they choose to
expose themselves to" (p. 10). In addition, it appears that individuals' preferences for
control vary widely. "People who most fear losing control are those who make a
special point of being in control all the time" (Viscott, 1976, p. 69). Control can be
linked to both physical and emotional pathology. A strong desire for control coupled
with low levels of competence and morality is also the surest way to produce leaders
who invariably ruin everything under their control. Indeed, a wide variety of
problems, such as mental disorders, marital breakdown, job stress, and low
productivity can be attributed to power struggles and the politics of control.
At this point, it should be clear that control is not only a crucial subject of study,
but also an extremely elusive one. In their book, Child Psychopathology and the Quest

for Control, (1989) Rothbaum and Weisz suggest the following:
Perhaps it is the pervasiveness of control that makes it so difficult to detect.
Unlike "drives" that manifest themselves in brief bursts of energy, control
motivation is a chronic condition. When not intensely directed toward specific
instrumental ends, it is seen in such everyday behaviors as play, exploration and
exercise. It is so much a part of our lives that we have difficulty stepping back
and taking stock of it. The aphorism 'The fish are the last to discover the ocean'
often applies to people's discovery of their desire for control. (p. 19)
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Given our strong motivation for control, and how pervasive that motivation is, it
seems important for us to understand as much about how we attempt to control our
own lives as possible. Despite the fact that there have been a proliferation of theories
from a number of disciplines attempting to explain various aspects of control, with no
one emerging as an organizing theory, there are things we know now which can be
used to design interventions for persons, children, employees, patients, the elderly, and
even nations. Each of the various theories adds to our knowledge of control and
coping, but none of them fully addresses the distinctions proposed in Rothbaum et
al.' s (1982) theory of primary and secondary control. These authors' two process
theory has been chosen as the subject of this investigation because it is one of the first
control theories to focus not only on what the experimenter can see the subject do or
not do, but also on the inner workings of the subject. The realization that individuals
attempt control not only through behaviors but also through cognitive processes opens
up a complex and fruitful area of study with enormous potential for application in the
real world. Perhaps by combining the research done in various fields on this concept,
conclusions can be drawn about when and how to use primary and secondary control
strategies most adaptively.
The purpose of the present paper is to bring together what we have learned about
primary and secondary control since 1982 when Rothbaum et al. first introduced these
concepts. The thesis will address the following six questions: (1) What is the two
process model and (2) how does it relate to other control theories such as locus of
control and learned helplessness? These questions will be addressed in Chapter Two.
(3) How do primary and secondary control processes change over the developmental
stages of the life cycle? Chapter Three will discuss changes from infancy to old age.
Questions (4) How does the two process model relate to physical health? and (5) Does
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use of primary and secondary control strategies change in different religions and
cultures? will be addressed in Chapter Four and (6) What are the implications for
future application and research? will be explored in Chapter Five.

CHAPTER TWO
THE TWO PROCESS MODEL AND OTHER CONTROL THEORIES

Control is a little like love; most of us know it when we see or feel it, but we
would be hard pressed to define it exactly. Researchers continue to wrestle with the
task of finding a way of pinning down this intangible construct. Most psychology of
control theories have been about behavior-can we make something happen? Miller
(1979) stated that control is the ability (actual or perceived, and present or potential) to
start, modify, or terminate stimuli. According to this definition, it would seem that
control is something that can be given by another (e.g., the experimenter) and,
therefore, something that can be taken away or limited (Piper & Langer, 1986).
Most other control theorists had similar definitions. Antonovsky (1979)
proposed a distinction between "being in control over things" (the self is in control)
and "things being under control" (i.e., others can be in control without harming one's
feelings of control). Thompson (1981) wrote that control is the belief that one has at
one's disposal a response that can influence the aversiveness of an event. White &
Janson (1986) theorized that control is an ability to cause or influence intended
outcomes by differential responding and results in a sense of effectiveness desired by
the individual person. Wallston, Wallston, Smith & Dobbins (1987) suggest that
perceived control is the belief that one can determine one's own internal states and
behavior, influence one's environment, and/or bring about desired outcomes. This
chapter will explain the two process model, state how its authors define control, and
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compare and contrast it with other leading theories of control psychology.

The Two Process Model
For the purposes of this thesis, control is defined as causing an intended event.
The essential difference between this definition, developed by Rothbaum et al. (1982),
and those of other control theorists is that an intended event may include influencing
external realities or influencing internal psychological states to affect the impact of
external realities on the self. According to the two process model, there are two broad
paths by which individuals attempt to pursue control. Rothbaum et al. suggest that,
generally, individuals attempt to alter objective realities in the world in order to bring
them into line with their wishes. This path is called primary control as it fits the more
traditional definition of control. If the individual is unsuccessful at primary control, he
may become withdrawn and passive. Learned helplessness and locus of control
theorists would, at this point, perceive that the individual had relinquished control.
Rothbaum and his colleagues, however, believe that individuals only rarely relinquish
control. Instead, the authors suggest that the individual will usually attempt to
accommodate to objective conditions by altering himself in order to effect a satisfying
alignment with existing realities. The two processes are outlined in Table 1.
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TABLE 1
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CONTROL: AN OVERVIEW
(Adapted from Weisz, Rothbaum & Blackburn, 1984)

Primary Control

Secondary Control

Overall Goal

enhance reward or reduce
punishment

enhance reward or reduce
punishment

Means to Goal

modify objective
conditions to fit self

modify self to fit objective
conditions

General Strategy

influence objective
conditions

accommodate to objective
conditions in order to
influence their impact on
self

Typical Targets

people, things, events,
symptoms, problems

one's own expectations,
ideas, wishes, perceptions,
goals

Rothbaum et al. originally proposed four types of secondary control based on
various patterns of causal attributions that people show in their reasoning about
control: predictive, illusory, vicarious and interpretive. Each secondary control type
also has a complementary form of primary control. Instead of a concentration on using
cognitions to change the self, the primary control strategy, like traditional views of
control, focuses on changing the environment. The difference between primary and
secondary control strategies is on where the subject places the emphasis. Descriptions
of primary and secondary control processes are included in Table 2.
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TABLE2
TYPES OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CONTROL
(Adapted from Blackburn, 1984)

Primary

Secondary

Predictive Control
attempts to ...

predict events and
conditions to select
strategies most likely to
make objective conditions
fit one's own needs, wishes,
goals

predict events and
conditions to control their
impact on self, especially
future disappointment

Illusory Control
attempts to ...

influence or capitalize on
chance to increase the
likelihood that fate will fit
one's needs, wishes, goals

get in synchrony with
chance to enhance comfort
with and acceptance of fate

Vicarious Control
attempts to ...

emulate the behavior,
values of powerful persons
groups or institutions to
influence objective
conditions as they do

associate or closely align
with other persons, groups
or institutions to share
psychologically in the
control they exert

Interpretive Control
attempts to ...

understand or construe
objective conditions to
master them (e.g.
understand a problem to
solve it)

understand or construe
objective conditions so as to
find meaning or purpose

Selective Attention
attempts to ...

focus attention on specific
elements of a problem to
solve it

focus attention away from a
problem to avoid the
unpleasant thoughts and
feelings associated with it
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Predictive primary control refers to attempts to predict events so as to succeed at
them. An example of predictive primary control would be attempting to predict what
questions an interviewer might ask in a job interview so as to be able to prepare
satisfactory answers before the meeting thereby enhancing one's attractiveness as a
job candidate. Predictive secondary control is primarily used to avert disappointment.
If an individual can predict an aversive event, she can adjust her expectations and,

therefore, experience less discrepancy and loss between the expected and the actual.
On the other hand, if the individual fails after expecting success, she suffers a double
defeat; not only has she failed to perform the task, but she has failed as a predictor as
well. Predicting that one will not be the candidate hired for the job position so as not
to be disappointed is an example of predictive secondary control.
Attempts to align the self with chance, luck or fate are instances of illusory
control. An example of illusory primary control would be realizing that it is
chance/fate which determines who wins a raffle and trying to influence your chances
by buying several tickets. An example of illusory secondary control is kissing the
tickets before you deposit them in the raffle box in hopes that you can seduce good
luck. Paradoxically, despite the fact that a person may admit that he knows that luck
and chance are entirely non contingent, he may still persist in the belief that he is
lucky by nature or that he can court luck with effort, superstitious behavior or rituals
(Weisz, 1986b).
Similarly, attempts to align the self with powerful others, or vicarious control,
involve the illusion that one can gain control by identifying with others who possess
characteristics such as dominance, expertise, competence and power (Rothbaum et
al.). By associating with and submitting to authority figures, the Lord, or the Chicago
Cubs, the individual hopes to attain vicarious control. An example of vicarious
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primary control would be imitating a successful athlete in hopes of being able to hit,
run or throw as well as he. Deriving a sense of control from attending the games of, or
wearing the colors or logo of, winning teams demonstrate vicarious secondary control.
Beliefs in supernatural powers, astrologers and mystics combine attempts to align the
self with both chance (illusory control) and powerful others (vicarious control).
All of the preceding secondary control processes; predictive, illusory and
vicarious; are involved in interpretive control. If an individual can understand the
meaning of an event, he can more easily accept it, and by accepting it, he perceives
himself to be in control of it and somewhat protected from it in the future. An example
of interpretive primary control is trying to understand why you were burglarized so
that you can minimize the consequences of and possible future instances of
victimization. Here, a person may try to determine if she was at fault in any way by
leaving a window unlocked or newspapers in the front yard. An example of
interpretive secondary control would be accepting the fact that you have been
traumatized and finding a "purpose" in it, such as reconsidering your attachment to
material things.
Blackbum (1984) introduced a fifth type of secondary control, selective
attention, in which the person controls unpleasant thoughts and feelings by focusing
his attention away from a problem. In primary selective attention, substance abusers
who are members of twelve-step groups focus their attempts to stay sober "one day at
a time", "one hour at a time" or even "one minute at a time" if necessary. While the
abuser is still using, however, she may focus her thoughts on anything but the
problems her substance use is creating in her life in order to avoid realizing she has a
problem. Besides selective attention, there are still more secondary control processes
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which have not been exposed as such at present (Weisz, personal correspondence).
Some of these will be discussed in Chapters Four and Five.
It is obvious that we cannot possibly change everything in our lives that we
might wish to. There will always be things we cannot alter and which we will have to
accept. Individuals are frequently confronted with the choice of either persisting at the
impossible or accepting a situation as it is. Choice will inevitably involve both positive
and negative consequences either way. When an individual relinquishes control, as
opposed to attempting primary or secondary control, he simply gives up. Not only
does he abandon the attempt to change his physical circumstances, he also makes no
attempt to fit into the circumstances. Before the two process model, theorists believed
that individuals frequently relinquished control. Rothbaum et al. propose that
individuals only rarely give up completely. Behind the inward, passive behaviors
associated with relinquished control are usually secondary control cognitions.
Primary and secondary control processes frequently intertwine, and finding an
optimal balance between them appears to be more adaptive than a reliance on either.
Whether a person is using primary or secondary control strategies or relinquishing
control depends on the person's reasons or goals for his behavior. This means that
establishing reliable and valid classification presents particular difficulty because
depending on direct observations or reports of behavior will not be sufficient (Weisz,
1990). Despite the fact that the above model presently lacks sufficient empirical
support, it offers an alternative to models which do not discuss control in
uncontrollable situations. Having discussed the two process model, other similar
perspectives by a wide range of psychological theorists will now be compared and
contrasted with it.

13
In his 1984 dissertation on primary and secondary control processes as they

apply to Type A coronary-prone behavior, Blackbum described the following similar
approaches:
Hartmann (1958) used the term alloplastic to refer to human action that adapts
the environment to human functions and autoplastic to refer to secondary
adaptations by the individual to the environments thus created. He stated that a
mix of alloplastic and autoplastic actions was most adaptive. Thibaut and Kelly
(1959) argued that in cases where external control is exercised over the
individual by other persons or agencies, "the adaptive solution would seem to
involve a recognition of external control and an acceptance of its indocility to his
efforts: (p. 85). These authors went on to suggest that persons are especially
sensitive to outcomes that fall within their range of control, thus enabling
maximal recognition of potential control over the environment. (pp. 16-17)

Mindfulness
Previous to the development of the two process model, little attention had been
paid to the importance of internal psychological realities in control strategies. Recently
we have realized that the subject's internal processes, difficult as they might be to
assess, are highly significant in any definition of control. Piper & Langer (1986)
explained that, according to the mindfulness interpretation, control exists in a mutually
defining relationship between the individual and the environment. It is the person's
internal processes which anchor the relationship, and, therefore, control is less likely
to be limited by external events or other persons. Langer (1989) states that when we
perform daily activities in a repetitive, routinized manner, (i.e., arriving home without
consciously remembering most of the drive), when we are being passively dependent
or when we attribute all our troubles to a single cause (premature cognitive
commitment), we are operating mindlessly. In the mindless state, we are vulnerable to
making mistakes and less able to react swiftly, adaptively or creatively to changes in
our environment. We are less aware of alternatives, and, therefore, less in control than
we could be.
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Mindfulness, on the other hand, is a state of alert awareness which renders us
better able to react to and to appreciate the context in which we find ourselves. Langer
believes that our cognitive capacity is not fixed but elastic, capable of growth. The
ability to respond to incoming information is increased to the extent that one is
mindful. From the perspective of the actor, giving up behavioral control may actually
be perceived as exercising and possessing control. From this vantage point, the
individual may mindfully examine various responses to determine which will most
successfully reduce arousal. Such an understanding is not possible within the
behavioral control model.

Learned Helplessness
When individuals learn that their voluntary behavioral responses do not affect
objective reality - in other words, when they cannot exert primary control - they
usually decrease the frequency of those responses. Seligman named this situation
learned helplessness (Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978; Seligman, 1975).
Although the contingency between the individual's actions and the outcome of an
event is seen as the most salient feature of this theory, it still becomes a conceptual
link between perceived control and the motivation to initiate voluntary action as a
means of exercising control (Blackbum, 1984). Inward behaviors are seen, at least in
part, as a motivational deficit (Seligman, 1975). In the two process model, the
situation determines which form of control will be most efficacious. In situations that
are uncontrollable, secondary control will be more adaptive than primary control or
relinquished control.
The reformulated learned helplessness theory suggests that when individuals are
faced with uncontrollable, aversive events, they ask themselves why. Those who make
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internal, stable and global attributions for failure suffer chronic and general feelings of
helplessness with accompanying low self-esteem. Causal attributions have been made
to limited ability, chance and powerful others.
The two process model also predicts that these individuals will experience
depression in situations of failure. However, their depression may not be as severe or
long-lasting if they are able to use secondary control to mitigate their loss. Thus, some
individuals who make internal, stable, and global attributions for failure may still (a)
find meaning in the event, (b) derive a sense of control from having predicted the
failure, (c) associate themselves with luck or (d) associate themselves with powerful
others.
Peterson & Seligman (1984) in a study of causal factors for depression stated
that "there are cognitive factors not included in helplessness theory that determine
responses to uncontrollable bad events including ... an individual's beliefs about the
consequences of uncontrollable events" (p. 111). Thus, helplessness theorists have
noted the importance of secondary control.

Locus of Control
Another theory which associates perceived uncontrollability with passive,
withdrawn behaviors comes from locus of control studies. In this formulation,
internals are individuals who believe that they primarily control the occurrence of
positive and negative reinforcements in their lives. Externals, on the other hand,
believe that reinforcing events are due to luck, chance or powerful others and are, in
general, more likely to manifest depressive symptoms and inward behaviors. This
difference leads internals and externals to make systematically different causal
attributions. Externals do not necessarily perceive themselves as powerless, however.
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Cherulink & Citrin (1974) concluded that externals simply pursue power in a different
way. Aligning themselves with luck or chance (illusory control) or powerful others
(vicarious control) would seem to be likely alternate ways for externals to avoid
feeling powerless.
Rothbaum et al. (1982) state that some of the most compelling behavioral
evidence of striving for interpretive control may come from the external's tendency to
alter individual desires and values so that they fit more closely the probable outcome
of a situation. Kenney (1987) seems to agree with that possibility when he states the
following:
a. externals more often express a preference for chance tasks compared to
internals (DuCette & Wolk, 1973; Kahle, 1980); b. externals perceive failure at
chance tasks as a loss of control; c. persons making external attributions at times
seem to evidence better adjustment (DesPeres, 1976; Felton & Kahana, 1974;
Frankl, 1963). Thus, it seems plausible to consider that externals may view
association with chance events as an alternative form of control and that the use
of this form of control may lead to better adjustment in certain situations. (p. 30)
This theory also has its limitations. Rotter's locus of control scale consists of a
number of control-related beliefs rather than the single dimension he had originally
proposed. The scale may also be more valid for white middle-class subjects than for
minority or lower socioeconomic class subjects (Gurin, Gurin, Lao, & Beattie, 1969;
Phares, 1976; see also Strickland, 1978). Further, the internal locus of control items
assess both effort (controllable) as well as ability (uncontrollable) which confounds
locus and controllability (Weiner, 1986).
Both helplessness and locus of control models define control as the ability to
respond in a way that will bring about a change in the environment. If only the
behaviors which an experimenter can see are important, these theorists must conclude
that when a subject exhibits passivity or withdrawal he must have passed control to
external sources (locus of control) or relinquished control (helplessness). What these

17
theories do not address is the powerful motivation individuals have to maintain
control. Rothbaum et al. (1982) state that the "motivation to feel 'in control' may be
expressed not only in behavior that is blatantly controlling but also, subtly, in behavior
that is not" (p. 7). Furthermore, the authors go on to suggest that inward behaviors
(submissiveness, withdrawal, passivity) are often associated with secondary control
rather than relinquished control. Rothbaum et al. suggest that the reason secondary
control has not been noted by these authors is that there have been few attempts to
measure it. Kenney (1987) found two studies (Cherulink & Citrin, 1974; Peterson &
Seligman, 1984) which seem to indicate that locus of control and helplessness
theorists are beginning to address secondary control as an important factor.

Sttess and Copin~ Paradi~m
The concept of control is often used in a manner similar to the concept of coping
(Blackburn, 1985; Langer, 1983; Lazarus, 1966; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Lazarus
and his associates do not refer to coping as an outcome, as in popular usage, but as a
process of "constantly changing cognitive and behavioral efforts to manage specific
external and/or internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the
resources of the person" (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, p. 141). These authors believe
that individuals appraise personal control in the context of a dynamic relationship
between the person and her environment which is constantly changing as the person
and the environment act on each other (Folkman, 1984). Lazarus believed that in
appraisal individuals evaluate events according to how salient they are to the
individual's well being. This cognitive process is not necessarily "conscious, verbal,
deliberate, or rational" (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) and may change several times during a
stressful encounter.
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According to this paradigm individuals determine the meaning of an event
through two types of cognitive appraisal. Primary appraisal involves a judgment
regarding how relevant the situation or event is to the individual. Primary appraisals
are mainly action-oriented and emotionally primitive as the individual reacts to loss,
threat, challenge or a combination of the above. An event which affects an
individual's commitments to values, ideals or goals will be evaluated as more
significant to that person's well being and, therefore, more stressful. In fact, the more
deeply held the commitments involved in a situation the more important it may be for
the individual to perceive himself in control over its outcome (Folkman, 1984).
Generalized beliefs about control such as internal or external locus of control
influence primary appraisal. Folkman (1984) makes a distinction between generalized
control beliefs and control as coping by stating the following:
Generalized beliefs about control and control appraisals are cognitive factors that
influence the appraisal of threat or challenge in a particular stressful encounter;
control as a coping process refers to cognitive and/or behavioral efforts to
exercise or seek control in that same encounter (see also Wong & Sproule,
1983). (p. 844)
Secondary appraisal involves decisions and emotions about options, resources
and abilities for responding to the event -in other words, how to cope with the
situation. The individual goes through a complex, dynamic and multifaceted
assessment of her psychological, physical, social and material resources for handling a
particular situation (Folkman, 1984). The appraisal attempts to answer questions such
as the following: How much of the situation can the individual control? What is it he
is exercising control over? How might an appraisal of coping change with new
information?
Lazarus then divided coping into two types: problem-focused and emotionfocused. Problem-focused coping is similar to primary control in that it is an attempt
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to change the person-environment situation through problem-solving, decision making
or direct action. Emotion-focused coping, like secondary control, relates to the
regulation of distressing emotion. Individuals usually employ both forms of coping in
varying proportions in stressful events, but Folkman (1984) suggests that the
effectiveness of problem-focused behavior is dependent on the success of emotionfocused strategies. "Otherwise, heightened emotions will interfere with the cognitive
activity necessary for problem-focused coping" (p. 845). The examples Folkman gives
of emotion-focused coping sound very much like secondary control strategies: (a)
devaluing the stakes that are at risk in an encounter, (b) focusing on the positive
aspects of negative outcomes, and (c) engaging in positive comparisons. In discussing
secondary control, she calls it "a form of emotion-focused coping that enhances
perceptions of control in ostensibly uncontrollable situations" (p. 844) and refers to it
as "defensive reappraisal."
In a comparison of the two process model to that of Lazarus and Folkman,
Kenney (1987) wrote the following:
... Lazarus & Folkman attempted to separate appraisal from coping (control).
Within the two-process model, it seems plausible that the meaning one derives
from a situation (interpretive control) and what one predicts to happen in a
situation (predictive control) may be part of an appraisal process. For example, if
an individual predicts that he will fail an exam and accepts this by saying
"everyone does poorly on exams once in awhile, I'll do better next time," this
would seem to be an integral part of the controVcoping process. In this example,
the individual would seem to be decreasing an appraisal of loss or threat and
increasing the appraisal of the situation as benign. Viewing appraisal as a form
of controVcoping may serve to highlight its importance in dealing with the
environment and oneself. (p. 15)
Assimilation and Accommodation.
Rothbaum et al. (1982) have noted the similarity between primary and secondary
control and the Piagetian concepts of assimilation and accommodation. Assimilation
involves the individual imposing his existing schema on new situations or ideas in
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order to fit his needs. He attempts to change outside reality by forcing it into his
preconceived notions, just as in primary control the individual attempts to change
outside reality with direct action. Accommodation involves modifying one's existing
schema to incorporate new knowledge thereby bringing oneself into line with a new
reality or idea. Both accommodation and secondary control usually involve change
within the individual. Accommodation involves changing the individual's schema
while secondary control involves changing the individual's desires.
There appear to be other similarities between the two process model and Piaget's
process of adaptation through accommodation, assimilation, and equilibration (the
biological and psychological balance the organism continually strives for). Both
theories stress that their two processes always work together in complementary
fashion. In fact, a reliance on one process over the other can be indicative of
pathological functioning (Piaget, 1983; Rosen, 1985; Rothbaum et al., 1982). The
primary difference between the two models may be that the two process model deals
with control while the Piagetian model deals with schema. Since these are different
constructs, there may not always be a high correlation between the occurrence of each
type of control and each type of schema (Kenney, 1987).
Kenney (1987) contrasts Piaget's and Rothbaum et al.'s approaches this way:
This difference becomes apparent when one considers how accommodation or
assimilation may be at work in situations of primary or secondary control. For
example, when a person cuts in front of you on the highway, you may deal with
this using primary control by honking your horn and trying to get him to change
his behavior. This may involve using your existing assimilative schema by
thinking of the driver as similar to other rude and inconsiderate drivers. Also,
you may notice an out-of-state license plate and use an accommodative schema
by changing your view of him versus other rude and inconsiderate drivers. For
instance, you may think, "This person is not only rude and inconsiderate, he also
doesn't know where he is going." So in this situation, the individual used
primary control but used both assimilation and accommodation. In a similar
situation, someone may cut in front of you and you may use secondary control
by thinking, "Well, sometimes I'm in a hurry, too." If this is a new way of
thinking about this situation, accommodation has occurred. If you are in the
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habit of accepting persons occasionally cutting in front of you on the highway,
the above process may be assimilative. As seen in the above example, then,
one's method of control can be accommodative or assimilative or both.
Conceptually, one's method of control does not necessitate the change of
knowledge structure (schema) or the maintenance of knowledge structure. (pp.
22-23)

Summary
Control can be conceived of as an appraisal process and as a coping process. As
such, the two process model is quite similar to Lazarus and Folkman's (1984) view of
the appraisal and coping process. However, primary, secondary and relinquished
control differ from these authors' concepts of emotion-focused and problem-focused
coping in that emotion-focused coping incorporates aspects of both primary and
secondary control (Kenney, 1987).
The present view of control is different from notions of control in learned
helplessness theory and locus of control theory. These theories typically recognize
primary control as the only means of avoiding perceptions of uncontrollability. They
see passive, withdrawn behaviors as signs of relinquished control whereas Rothbaum
et al. believe that the motivation for control is so strong that the occurrence of
relinquished control is very rare. Instead, individuals will attempt to maintain a
perception of control by switching to secondary control processes. How primary and
secondary control processes develop over an individual's life span will be discussed in
the next chapter.

CHAPTER THREE
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CONTROL
PROCESSES OVER THE LIFE SPAN

For infants, loud cries usually produce an adult to care for their needs. Adults
have the ability and the physical and intellectual resources to provide most things for
themselves. In old age, however, as our abilities decline and our resources wane, we
may again need an adult to take care of us, but this time we must use a call button to
summon her.
There is growing evidence that the structure of control-related beliefs changes
over the life cycle. Weisz (1983) has argued that in order to judge the amount and type
of control we can exert in a situation, we must accurately gauge the degree to which
the target outcome can be influenced by variations in people's behavior (a contingency
judgment), we must correctly assess our level of competence to produce the behavioral
variations on which the target outcome is contingent (a competence judgment), and we
must combine the contingency and competence judgments in a logical manner. Our
ability to do those complex calculations is affected by our developmental stage.
Before exploring how perceived control in general, and primary and secondary control
in particular, change over the life span, a brief discussion of contingency and
competence is appropriate.

Contin&ency
During a storm, preschool children often sing, "Rain, rain, go away; come again
some other day." If the rain actually stops, they will be convinced it was because they
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sang. Sometimes the environment appears to give us evidence of our ability to cause
events which are, in fact, not in our control. Several authors have stated that an
illusion of control may be characteristic of much adaptive human functioning (Taylor
& Brown, 1988). Many times there simply is not enough information to assess

accurately whether or not there is contingency. A child's illusion of control would
involve the erroneous belief that she could produce a positive outcome when no such
contingency existed. This would seem to be the opposite of Seligman' s notion of
learned helplessness, the erroneous belief that one has no control to affect the outcome
of a given event when contingency does in fact exist between response and outcome
(Langer, 1983).
Competence
Children may also need to be at a certain point developmentally before they can
make accurate assessments of their own competency to produce the outcomes they
want. Weisz (1983) submits that by middle to late childhood, children may have
developed cognitively so that there are necessary but not sufficient conditions for
veridical control judgments. Bandura' s ( 1981) theoretical account of the
developmental course of self-efficacy may be helpful in understanding this concept.
Bandura states that infants develop a "sense of personal agency" as they realize their
ability to produce effects on the physical and social world. As they get older, children
use their peer relations and rate of success with academic and cognitive tasks in school
to hone their assessments of their competence. Adults have ample opportunities to
gauge their competence in their marital and family relationships and careers and, as
their assessments become more realistic, may become painfully aware of the
limitations of their abilities. Because of social stereotypes, among other reasons, the
elderly frequently underestimate their competence in many important areas.
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Our ability to judge the amount of control we have in situations has important
implications for us. There will be circumstances in our lives which are undesirable but
unchangeable. Continuing to use primary control strategies in those circumstances will
most likely produce frustration and helplessness. On the other hand, our ability to
judge an outcome as noncontingent may help us to abandon the use of primary control
in favor of secondary control. Not only will we discontinue expending effort uselessly,
we may find meaning or purpose in those unalterable circumstances which may be
helpful for ourselves and others.

Infancy
Unfortunately, infants cannot tell us whether or not they ever shift into using
secondary control when their primary control attempts fail, and there is no way to
ascertain this by observation. There has been some work on the development of
control during the first twelve months, however. Gunnar (1982), in a literature review,
found evidence that indicated that children 1-4 months old begin and end interactions
with significant adults, thereby exercising a degree of control. Also, 2-4-month-olds
showed distress when adult caregivers did not respond when the baby looked directly
at or away from them. Infants appear to be able to learn to produce behavior which has
been associated with certain pleasurable outcomes under careful experimental
conditions. For instance, infants as young as 2 months of age who are exposed to
response-contingent reinforcement (e.g., movements of a mobile triggered by the
infant's head movements) appear to become functionally aware of the contingency
(Suomi, 1981). This seems to support Watson's (1971) contention that contingency
analysis begins at the age of about 8-to-12- weeks.
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At 4 to 8 months, Gunnar found that the infant becomes "an active agent in
producing stimulation" (p. 4). When an action brings about some interesting outcome,
the infant repeats it. His awareness of limits on his ability to control appears to begin
at 8 to 12 months. He begins to be afraid of strangers as he realizes that people are not
as easily controlled as physical objects. By the age of 12 months, the distress the
infant shows at being presented with a potentially frightening toy can be reduced by
giving her the opportunity to exert control over it.

Early Childhood Throu~h Adolescence
Much more is known about children's control-related beliefs once they become
verbal. Weisz (1983, 1986a & b, and 1990) and his colleagues have conducted both
laboratory and field studies on the development of children's contingency reasoning
by exposing them to outcomes which are either contingent (skill tasks) or
noncontingent (games of chance). When asked to explain what caused their own or
another person's outcomes, most of the children (5-13-year-olds) had some awareness
of what the term "control" meant, for the most part using the term in three ways:
Control over inanimate objects, interpersonal control and self-control.
Children below age 7 generally failed to distinguish between contingent
outcomes and chance outcomes. For the most part they attributed the outcomes to
contingent events (i.e., "I didn't try hard enough") (Weisz, 1980, 1981; Weisz, Yeates,
Robertson & Beckham, 1982). On the other hand, late-elementary-school or older
children were usually able to recognize the chance outcomes as being noncontingent.
Weisz (1983) concluded that the ability to distinguish between contingent and
noncontingent events began to emerge at around the sixth year and that it was rather
firmly in place by adolescence.
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Compas, Banez, Malcarne, & Worsham (1991) suggested that developmental
changes in control-related beliefs depend on the characteristics of tasks and the types
of cognitive skills necessary to understand those tasks. They state that children move
from overestimating contingency at age 6 to more realistic assessments by about age
11. During this time, they also begin to recognize the possibility of an uncontrollable
internal cause, and they show a decrease in attributions to external factors such as luck
and powerful others. However, mean levels of contingency, competence, and control
beliefs do not tend to change substantially with age.
At the same time children believe that they can stop the rain by singing and that
the moon follows them around, they also believe they can drive a car and build a
working space ship. Fortunately for parents, it appears that levels of perceived
competence may grow increasingly more realistic with development. Weisz reported
in two studies (Weisz, 1977; Weisz & Achenbach, 1975) that, when he asked children
to rate how competent they were compared to others in their school at a conceptformation task, their self-ratings declined significantly with increasing mental age. IQ
made no difference (Weisz, 1983). These findings are similar to several other studies
(Nicholls, 1978; Freedman, 1975; Phillips, 1963).
Further evidence was found by Stipek & Weisz (1981) who compared selfratings with teacher classifications by increasing grade level. She found that second
and third graders' self-ratings were significantly related to where their teachers had
placed them in class rankings (i.e., top versus bottom third of the class). By contrast
kindergartners and first graders placed themselves considerably high regardless of
whether their teachers had rated them within the upper or lower third.
Schulz, Heckhausen, and Locher (1991) provide us with a useful summary of the
development of primary control, contingency and competence in childhood:
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Early development is characterized by an increasing ability to exert primary
control over the environment. One of the hallmarks of biological and social
development in early childhood is the increasing ability to produce behaviorevent contingencies. The action-outcome experiences of the child provide the
basis for the development of self-competence, including generalized
expectancies of control and perceptions of self-efficacy. As development
progresses, children attain the capacity to differentiate competence into ability
and effort, and develop domain-specific expectations for control - that is,
individuals begin to select the domains of their life in which they will invest
their highest expectancies for control, e.g., sports, career, family (Heckhausen &
Schulz, 1990). (p. 181)
If judgments of contingency and competence are affected by development, it

would seem logical that secondary control may be as well. To test this hypothesis,
Brotman-Band and Weisz (1988) asked 6-, 9-, and 12-year-olds to describe stressful
episodes they had experienced and their behavior and goals during those episodes.
Their responses were coded for primary, secondary or relinquished control. Lazarus
and Folkman's (1984) Ways of Coping Checklist was also used. The authors found
that, as with adults, there was a very low frequency of relinquished control. Reports of
secondary control coping (alone or in combination with primary control coping)
increased with age, whereas reports involving only the use of primary coping declined
with age.
In another study, Brotman-Band (1989) interviewed 8-year-old and 14-year-old

children with juvenile diabetes about the particular stresses they experienced. These
children could not change the fact of having diabetes but were required to perform
several primary control behaviors to deal with it such as giving themselves insulin
injections. Again, relinquished control was rare with the 8-year-olds relying on
primary control goals significantly more than the older group. An interesting finding
was that scores reflecting greater reliance on secondary control goals were associated
with poorer physician's ratings of medical adjustment. Evidently, broad use of
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secondary control can be analogous to declines in appropriate primary control - such
as precise adherence to an appropriate diet and the prescribed medical regimen.
In an exploratory study, Cameron (1984) administered her Children's PrimarySecondary Control Scale to 95 fifth and sixth graders. She found that a strong
emphasis on primary control may be associated with undesirable behaviors at home or
in school. Those few children who relinquished control also showed poorer school
achievement and more behavior problems than those who used more secondary
control strategies. Cameron concluded that secondary control strategies may be more
adaptive for children in school and home settings than primary or relinquished control.
Weisz (1986b) speculated that children are expected to comply with rules and give in
to authority in school and home settings. Therefore, actively pursuing primary control
may take the form of disobeying or defiance, which would generally be maladaptive.
Yielding because the child has given up could lead to feelings of helplessness, which
would also be maladaptive and likely jeopardize achievement. If the child can retain a
sense of control by using secondary control strategies in those situations where she
must comply, there may be fewer negative correlates.
Weisz (1990) has speculated on the reasons that secondary control responses
may emerge somewhat later in development than primary control responses. On a
practical level, cognitions are not observable, and, therefore, children cannot learn
them through observation. As children mature and find that primary control does not
always bring the results they wish, they may begin to question their illusions of
control. Eventually, they may turn to secondary control strategies as a means of
retaining some measure of control. Weisz (1990) suggests the following:
... Secondary control goals may be more likely to be included among coping
objectives (a) when the individuals doing the coping are relatively mature
cognitively, (b) when the stressful situations involved place limits on the
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possibility of primary control, and (c) particularly when both (a) and (b) hold
true. (p. 129)
Rosenberg (1990) suggested that younger children may not have developed
enough awareness of their thoughts and feelings to use one to regulate the other. He
quotes Piaget (1951) saying " .. .in virtue of his very ego-centrism, the child is not
conscious of his own thought ... " (p. 179). Without the resources to use secondary
control strategies, the child may be forced to rely on primary control just at a time in
his life when he is least competent to act on the world directly. Being unable to judge
contingency accurately may lead to depression in children who are not sure whether a
failure event is their own fault or whether or not to persist at a task. According to
Wiesz, Weiss, Wasserman, and Rintoul (1987), therapists could help children to
identify causes of both failure and success as part of their treatment for depression.

Adulthood
The next chapter of this paper will examine studies of primary and secondary
control strategies as they pertain to cultural and religious differences as well as health
outcomes of adults. Therefore, the discussion of adults in this section will be limited to
developmental issues. One of the tasks of adulthood is to further define perceptions of
control. The uncontrollability theorists would argue that adults conceptualize an
adaptive level of perceived control in terms of primary control alone. Rothbaum et al.
(1982), however, suggest that adaptiveness is a matter of knowing how and when to
exert primary or secondary control and how to integrate the two.
Weisz (1983) has suggested that although most studies confound competence
and contingency, it appears that, in general, adults are overly optimistic about their
competence and see contingency where none exists (Alloy & Abramson, 1979;
Langer, 1975,1977; Brim, 1980). According to Schulz, et al. (1991), over time
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individuals get better at assessing what they can and cannot accomplish within one life
span. They seem to prefer primary to secondary control processes, but begin to use
increasingly more secondary control strategies as their physical abilities diminish
with age.
Believing oneself to be more responsible for and competent to handle situations
than is the case has both advantages and negative consequences. Being overly
optimistic may contribute to the decision to persist in an effort long enough to succeed
at it. On the other hand, if that effort is beyond one's capabilities or impossible, the
effort is wasted and the individual will experience failure with its usual consequence
of diminished self esteem.
Langer (1975, 1977) has suggested that people may perceive contingencies
where none exist in order to avoid the anxiety and depression that accompany
uncontrollability. She states that the degree of this illusion of control is influenced by
the following factors: (a) perceived competence of a competitor on a task (even when
the task is chance-related), (b) having a choice or selection, (c) being familiar with the
situation, or (d) increasing concentration on the event. Subjects may attempt to obtain
control through superstitious factors (e.g. blowing on dice before throwing them), or
by aligning themselves with a chance event (e.g. valuing a familiar lottery number
more than an unfamiliar one). What these factors have in common is that they increase
the involvement of the participant through either behavioral or cognitive means.
Langer and Roth (1975) found that those who predicted the outcomes of a coin toss (a
chance event) rated themselves significantly higher in competence than those students
who merely observed. The authors suggested that the students who were more
involved in the event exhibited more illusion of control. These young, presumably
intelligent, adults illogically misjudged that their competence had an effect ona
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noncontingent event. Langer's illusion of control parallels illusory secondary control
in the two process model. Rothbaum et al. (1982) agree that when people misperceive
chance-determined events as skill-determined, their involvement in that chance
situation, and thus their perception of alignment with chance (illusory secondary
control), increases with the passage of time.
There has been some work on which individuals in what situations are most
likely to maintain an illusion of control. If people realistically identify factors such as
chance and luck as being in control of outcomes, but somehow believe that they can
influence chance or luck, they may experience repeated failure in an inherently
uncontrollable world. In a study of 204 female college students, Schmitz (1987)
administered the Attributional Style Questionnaire, the Beck Depression Inventory,
Levenson' s I, P, and C Scales, the Life Events Questionnaire, the MMPI, Rotter's
Internal-External Locus of Control Measure, the Tennessee Self Concept Scale and the
Student Primary-Secondary Control Preference Scale developed by Blackburn (1984).
Information regarding women's causal attributions for negative and positive events
was not found to be of assistance in making predictions about depression or selfesteem deficits, but information regarding their beliefs about control and recent life
experiences was. Level of perceived competence was the most effective means of
distinguishing between people on the basis of depression. Contingency beliefs were
less relevant to depression, but very related to self-esteem. Abramson and Sackheim
( 1977) called the process of being able to identify noncontingency of outcomes, while
still attributing responsibility to the self, the "depressive paradox."
If "depression is the common cold of psychopathology," as Seligman (1973, p.

43) has suggested, then most adults will be subject to it to some degree at some time
or another. Seligman and other learned helplessness theorists have suggested that
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depressed people underestimate the contingency between outcomes and their behavior
(Alloy & Seligman, 1978). Alloy & Abramson (1979), however, in a seminal study,
found that depressives view the contingency of their outcomes realistically, and it is
the nondepressed who show distorted contingency judgment. Evidence suggests that
individuals who score high in desire for control demonstrate a greater illusion of
control (Burger, 1986; Burger & Cooper, 1979), but low desired control scores
correlate with depression (Burger, 1984).
Learned helplessness theorists see depression as a behavioral manifestation of
perceived uncontrollability. Rothbaum et al. (1982) argue that the passivity and
perceived lack of effort shown by some subjects may be a reflection of the subjects'
attempts to excuse failure. They refer to Frankel and Snyder's (1978) theory that
withdrawal and passivity reflect a desire to minimize or diffuse failure on a task
thereby preserving self-esteem and a sense of control. An induced helplessness
procedure (which makes primary control ineffective) may temporarily lower subjects'
self-esteem, resulting in a switch to predictive secondary control in order to avoid the
disappointment of failure. By deliberately sabotaging success at a task, the subject is
able to predict the outcome and therefore feels in more control of it.
Berglas and Jones (1978; Jones & Berglas, 1978) state that the burden of feeling
responsible for success or failure, despite perceiving that the task is noncontingent,
sometimes motivates individuals to adopt a self-handicapping strategy. The authors
describe a self-handicapping behavior as one that allows the individual to externalize
failure and internalize success. In other words, these individuals perceive that they
have no control over a task but that they are doomed to failure. They then sabotage
their efforts in order to maintain their self-esteem by blaming their success or failure
on external, specific, unstable factors. An individual who relinquishes control, yet
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maintains that he has control of the situation, despite knowing that the results are due
to chance or luck, is demonstrating illusory secondary control.
Uncontrollability theorists cannot explain why depressed subjects continue selfdefeating behaviors even after success experiences (see e.g., Beck, 1967). According
to the two process model, however, this phenomenon is explained by predictive
secondary control. Depressed subjects may have had repeated past failures in which
they have attempted to minimize disappointment by expecting failure rather than
"getting their hopes up." If they were to acknowledge a success and change their
actions accordingly, the viability of a predictive secondary control strategy would be
compromised. If they were to begin to hope, disappointment would be even greater
when they failed in the future than if they had predicted failure from the start.
A study conducted by Burger and Arkin (1980) yielded results consistent with
this theory. This study examined the effects of perceived (primary) control and
predictability of an aversive event on depressive affect and subsequent performance of
a memory task. The uncontrollable-unpredictable group performed significantly worse
on the memory task and reported more depression than the control group. The authors
concluded that "the perception of control or predictability concerning the aversive
event was thus sufficient to mitigate learned helplessness, suggesting the functional
equivalence of perceived control and predictability" (p. 482).
Further support that nondepressed adults display an illusion of control, but that
depressed adults do not, comes from Golin, Terrell, Weisz & Prost (1979) and Golin,
Terrell, & Johnson (1977). In the first study, depressed subjects were shown to have
more confidence in a low-illusion condition (experimenter threw the dice in a dice
game) than in a high-illusion condition (subject threw the dice). Nondepressives had
more confidence in their own dice throws than the experimenter's. In the second
.

..

~

34
study, Golin replicated these findings for a more severely depressed population.
According to the two process model, the depressives appear to be aligning themselves
with the experimenter, thereby displaying vicarious secondary control. The
nondepressives attempt to demonstrate primary control by throwing the dice
themselves in hopes of influencing the outcome. Weisz (1983) speculated that since
the nondepressed subjects had the illusion of competence and contingency (illusory
secondary control) they felt more confident when they were throwing the dice. Since
depressed subjects have lower estimates of their competence, they may have felt more
confidence in the experimenter's "ability" to throw the dice. Weisz points out the
interesting deduction that the depressed subjects mistakenly believed they were less
competent than the experimenter, and the nondepressed subjects mistakenly believed
they were more competent than the experimenter, on a task which was entirely
uncontrollable.
Lewinsohn, Mischel, Chaplin, & Barton (1980) found that depressed subjects
made much more veridical judgments about their own social competence than did
either disturbed or nondisturbed control subjects who were not depressed. Although
the realism of the depressed group declined over a course of treatment, they still
viewed themselves as less competent socially than the nondepressed did. Lewinsohn et
al., (1980) suggested the possibility that nondepressed people exhibit an illusory glow
of exaggerated perceptions of personal competence. Weisz (1983) hypothesized that
one possible causal pattern might be that this warm glow leads to a selective focus on,
and memory for, an individual's positive attributes and accomplishments, thereby
sustaining positive self-perceptions and positive mood. This would seem to be an
example of selective attention secondary control.
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Secondary selective attention may be more adaptive than is generally realized.
From a study which had subjects complete a life events inventory, the Beck
Depression Scale and the Repression-Sensitization Scale, Neiswender (1991 ) reports
that:
The results indicated that the most effective copers (as measured by depression
scores) were those who used repression or denial to cope with recent life events.
This is similar to work by Miller, Leinbach, & Brody (1989) and Miller, Brody,
and Summerton (1988). (p. 14)
Although there have been many studies reporting that individuals who perceive
themselves to have low subjective primary control are depressed, having primary
control may sometimes lead to negative reactions as well. Miller (1980) found that
subjects, when given a choice to yield control of electric shocks to a yoked partner,
were less anxious than those who retained control. Rodin, Rennert & Solomon (1980)
found that subjects given a choice of which personality test to take or permission to
ask questions during an interview reported lower self-esteem on a subsequent task
than those subjects who were not given choices. In a field study, Mills and Krantz
(1979) manipulated primary control by allowing subjects to choose the arm from
which they wanted blood drawn. The experimenters also manipulated secondary
control by giving some subjects more information about the procedure. The subjects
who were given a choice and more information reported more anxiety than those
subjects who were not given a choice. If there are individual differences in style of
control, some subjects may prefer a secondary control process rather than a primary
control process, in which case these results make more sense. In the Miller (1980)
study, the subjects who yielded control may have been selecting their preferred control
process (i.e., vicarious secondary control) and therefore experienced a reduction in
anxiety. The subjects who maintained control also selected their preferred style of
control, but did so at the cost of being responsible, and possibly experiencing more
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self-blame, for shocks both to themselves and the other subject. Thus, the subject who
retained control over the shock may have experienced less anxiety if he was not also
responsible for the other person's well-being.
The evidence for gender differences in preference for primary or secondary
control are equivocal. Blackburn (1984) found no sex differences when he
administered the Student Primary and Secondary Control Preference Scale to college
students even though he was investigating the differences between Type A and Type
B personality styles. His results support Gaeddert (1987) who found that students'
gender had little impact on their attributions. Ganong and Coleman (1987) found that
males and females were equal in the degree they utilized active (primary control) or
yielding (secondary control) methods of self-control. This finding corroborated
Shapiro and Shapiro (1983). Cameron (1983) found no gender-related differences
among 11- to 13-year-olds, although Band & Weisz (1988) report that boys and girls
differ in how they choose to handle stress. When a difference is found it is usually that
males show a preference for primary control while females favor secondary strategies
(Cameron, 1983). In a German study, Brandtstadter, Krampen, & Greve (1987)
examined self-corrective activities which they considered a form of secondary control.
Females showed a stronger tendency toward self-corrective change than males.
Support for Rothbaum et al.' s notion that a balance of primary and secondary
control is most adaptive for adults is found in a study conducted by Coyne, Aldwith
and Lazarus (1981). The subjects, middle-aged persons divided into depressed and
nondepressed groups, provided interview and questionnaire data over the course of a
year, describing stressful situations they had encountered and the thoughts and actions
which they had used to cope. Unexpectedly, the depressed subjects used as much
problem-focused (primary) coping as the nondepressed subjects. Although, they were
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no more self-blaming than the nondepressed subjects, the depressed individuals were
less likely to see their stressful situations as something to accept.
Schmitz (1987) has posited that there may be a continuum in which efforts
toward primary control may decline with decreased perceptions of competence.
Secondary control may increase accordingly, as long as some belief in contingency
persists. As people perceive outcomes to be more and more erratic and arbitrary,
secondary control may give way to relinquished control.

The major life events experienced by the elderly involve loss (Butler, 1975). At
retirement an individual experiences a major loss of actual contingency in the world of
work. Even her health is less dependent on primary control strategies such as diet,
exercise, and moderation as biological systems begin to break down. If she is moved
into an institution, she will experience an extreme loss of contingency as she must
adjust herself to the institution's schedule of meals, visiting hours, bed- and even bathtimes rather than her own. She becomes infantilized as her everyday activities are
conformed to the institution's bureaucratic rules. If she has been involuntarily
relocated to the institution (as most nursing home residents are), she has an increased
risk of morbidity and mortality (Aldrich and Mendkoff, 1963; Killiam, 1970). Weisz
(1983) hypothesized that:
If such declines in actual contingency are accompanied by increasingly
depressed affect, and if depressed affect is associated with especially veridical
judgments of actual contingency, the result may be a kind of downward spiral
characterized by increasingly accurate perceptions of increasing noncontingent
life events. In turn, there is often an increased dependency on others to meet
one's needs in terms of activities of daily living .... A major developmental task
for this age group is to strive to maintain some sense of mastery and control
while accepting the inevitable losses that accompany aging. (p. 258-259)
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Apathy and depressed affect are said to be disproportionately frequent among the
aged, particularly the institutionalized aged (Langer, 1982; Schulz, 1980; Schulz &
Brenner, 1977). Even if primary control is possible upon entering a nursing home, the
patient is lulled into mindlessness (see Chapter Two) by the boring routine and
predictability of the institution (Chanowitz and Langer, 1980). Generally, the resident
has a choice between helplessness or secondary control.
The two process model can help make sense of the relation between
controllability and depression for older individuals. Because primary control is
constrained by biological and environmental factors, secondary control becomes
especially salient for the elderly. There is considerable evidence suggesting that
seniors, especially those in institutions, perceive low levels of contingency (Langer,
1981; Langer & Rodin, 1976) and perceived competence also declines. According to
Brim (1974), acknowledging that many of one's dreams will never be realized,
watching one's children become absorbed in their own lives and friends pass away,
contemplating the inevitability of one's own death may begin in mid-life but reach a
special intensity in old age. In light of these real and anticipated losses, predictability,
finding meaning and purpose in life events (interpretive secondary control) and
alignment with physicians, God and other powerful others (vicarious secondary
control) can be especially useful for older adults.
Irion (1988) interviewed 70 nursing home residents screened for absence of
substantial cognitive impairment about their perceptions of control over meals,
activities, privacy and schedule. She found that primary, secondary and relinquished
control were significant predictors of outcomes over and above the effects of
demographics or symptoms of aging or physical disability. Traditional control theory
constructs did not add to the prediction of well-being once primary, secondary, and
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relinquished control were considered. Irion concluded that "The unique contribution
of two-process control constructs suggests that they are tapping another dimension of
controllability that traditional models have not adequately captured" (p. 73).
Schulz (1980) cited several laboratory studies (Dweck & Repucci, 1973; Hanusa
& Schulz, 1977; Hiroto, 1974) which suggest that a lack of control is most devastating
when it carries implications for the individual's competence or worth. Langer (1982)
states that the elderly, particularly those in institutions, are particularly susceptible to
this devastation since they perceive themselves as more incompetent than they
actually are. She reviewed a number of studies which appear to show that mistaken.
perceptions of incompetence can be induced by (a) being assigned a deprecating label
such as "old" (b) being no longer able to engage in a task that one formerly engaged in
but that is now engaged in by another (a job, in the case of the retired elderly), and (c)
allowing someone else to help you (something that often occurs unnecessarily among
the elderly).
Taken from another perspective, Ziegler and Reid (1983) found that in their 79
nursing home resident subjects, a greater desire for control was related to greater
happiness and better health, though the authors did not posit a causal relationship.
Desire for control in an environment which discourages autonomy can pose serious
problems. Experiments with giving nursing home residents more control have had
mixed results. Although most experimenters assume that more personal control will
lead to positive consequences, interventions which seek to enhance personal autonomy
sometimes backfire. If those interventions are removed from the institutional
environment after the experiment, morbidity and mortality increase (Schulz and
Hanusa, 1978). Failing to take into account the very real constraints imposed by the
institution and the limited capacities of an older, unwell individual, the experimenter

40

may, in seeking to increase autonomy, foster helplessness. Schulz (1980) suggests,
"Manipulations that increase control and at the same time elevate feelings of
competence should have a greater and a longer lasting positive impact than controlenhancing interventions that do not affect competence attributions" (p. 272).
Weisz (1983) speculates that interventions designed to heighten perceived
contingency among the elderly (e.g., Langer & Rodin, 1976; Schulz, 1976) may be
more effective, especially in the long run, if they are compatible with the realities of
the life situations of the individuals than if they represent more temporary, fleeting
changes that are difficult to sustain after the experiment has been completed. Kuypers

& Bengston (1973) argue for interventions that foster feelings of competence in
social-role performance, personal mastery and inner control. Enhancing secondary
control may be much more adaptive for seniors than attempts to increase primary
control given the reality of fewer opportunities to exercise behavioral control.
According to a literature review by White and Janson (1986), "Those most at risk for
true helplessness are the depressed residents with the highest internal locus of control
attempting to utilize primary control strategies" (p. 309).
A finding which appears in several studies is that religious faith seems to be
particularly salient among the aged. For example, Strickland and Shaffer (1971)
found elders to be more internal and reported significant positive relations between
age, internality and intrinsic religious stance. Koenig, George & Siegler, (1988) found
that religious attitudes (i.e., faith or trust in God, strength derived from God, private
prayer) and other intrapsychic and cognitive methods (i.e., acceptance, comparison of
self to others) comprised the most predominant strategies that older individuals found
effective in handling stress.
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Shaw (1989) found in a study of coping and control in nursing home residents
that secondary control was used when the amount of perceived control was low, and it
was somewhat influential on coping effectiveness. She reported that in her interviews
many of the residents said that prayer was their only means of dealing with living in a
nursing home. Irion (1988) heard similar statements in her interviews. She writes,
"For example, items intended to tap traditional intemality such as, 'When I get what I
want, it's usually because I worked hard for it,' prompted comments such as, 'I pray a
lot about it, and if it's God's will, I'll get it"' (p. 77).
In a paper integrating theology and psychological theories, Spilka and Bridges
(1989) seem to be speaking about the religious stance of nursing home residents when
they write, "Theologically, the issue is that of salvation, understood here as salvation
from meaninglessness to meaning, from an unhealthy self-image to a healthy one, and
from helplessness to control" (p. 347). In an explanation of primary and secondary
control strategies they list the following:
(1) From an individual perspective in traditional religion, power and control are
usually associated with prayer. Though prayer satisfies a number of motives,
most people pray to effect some change in objective reality which will resolve a
problem (Clark, 1958). The aspiration is primary control, but the outcome is not
usually up to the individual. By engaging in prayer, the person feels more
capable and has thus changed the self - inadvertently providing a secondary
control function.
(2) Though Ogden (1963) still looks to prayer's "ultimate significance, that it be
heard by God" (p. 67), his accent is overwhelmingly on what prayer does for the
person. Implied is the objective power of God, and hence we have a kind of
vicarious control. Personal prayer gives the individual the feeling that the burden
is now in the hands of God. There has been a transfer of power from the person
of God, with the individual benefiting by gaining a sense of security that control
is in the "best" hands. This is the language of secondary control. (p. 348)
The authors write of the hope, engendered by religious faith, that predicting
salvation and deliverance gives the supplicant. "Helplessness is thus countered, and
immediate burdens are lightened" (p. 349). Felton and Kahana (1974) hypothesize that
a belief in external control among institutionalized older adults may reflect their need
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to "seek out a champion ... , a mediator between the powerless self and the rigid
institutional milieu" (p. 300).

Summaiy
At different times over the life course, the issue of control and the related
concept of autonomy (i.e., self reliance; the ability to function independently) become
more or less salient. For example, according to Erikson's (1950) theory of psychosocial development, young children learning to master their bodily functions and
trying to assert their independence face the task of establishing a sense of autonomy
versus one of shame and doubt. Again in adolescence and young adulthood, the
individual is challenged to become more independent, establish a sense of identity,
and make choices concerning the future (Erickson, 1968). Hence, for both the young
child and the adolescent or young adult, asserting control over the environment and
cultivating a sense of autonomy are key developmental processes. By contrast, older
adults are faced with concerns such as retirement, widowhood, declining health and
physical functioning (Bengston, 1973; Kuypers & Bengston, 1973).
Aldwin & Revenson (1985) found that older adults perceive themselves as
responsible for the occurrence of a stressful event less often than younger adults, but
both groups took equal responsibility for managing the stressful event. Perhaps the use
of secondary control is more characteristic of older individuals, especially in
uncontrollable circumstances, and represents a developmental progression from young
adulthood during which primary control is tantamount. Secondary control affords the
individual in a highly constrained environment the opportunity to perceive some sense
of control, whether it be through positive reappraisal (i.e., interpretive control),
association with and trust in the staff, God or the physician (i.e., vicarious control),
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belief in fate (i.e., illusory control) or restructuring expectations (i.e., predictive
control). As individuals reach middle and old age, most cultures downplay attributes
related to primary control, such as physical abilities, and emphasize attributes related
to secondary control, such as wisdom (Sternberg, 1990). These prescriptions provide
individuals with the opportunity to maintain a sense of equilibrium in the face of
biological senescence (Schultz, et al. 1991 ). With the gradual erosion of primary
control during the later years, Shultz, et al. (1991) suggest, comes the wisdom to
"shuck off' some of the sense of responsibility for things we cannot change. In the
light of these considerations, a question posed by the insightful folk psychologist
Satchel Paige, quoted by Bandura (1981), is worth repeating: "How old would you be
if you didn't know how old you was?" (Weisz, 1983, p. 277).
Trillin (1981) quotes William Saroyon exercising secondary control by saying,
"I'm growing old! I'm falling apart! And it's VERY INTERESTING!" Also very
interesting is how the two process model is involved in health care. The next chapter
will explore not only health care, but religion and culture which are even more
interesting!

CHAPTER FOUR
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CONTROL
IN HEALTH, CULTURE AND RELIGION

There are a myriad of arenas in which to study the two process model of
perceived control, from romance to employee relations. In the last chapter, the
development of the uses of primary and secondary control strategies was discussed.
Although this concept is relatively new, and studies have just begun to scratch the
surface, this chapter covers three fields where research has been most extensive. There
is much overlap between health, religion and culture, so the boundaries between
sections of this chapter are diffuse rather than rigid.

Health
People's perceptions of control over their health status can affect their behavior
as well as the course of any illness.
" ... Becoming ill can be a shock to a person's sense of security and to his or
her self-image. Not only does it threaten the customary view of oneself, but it
further underscores that one is indeed vulnerable (to illness, and perhaps then to
other problems), that life is uncertain, that one may have little control over
events... " (Cohen and Lazarus, 1979, p. 218)
Being injured in an accident, being hospitalized, developing a chronic illness all
bring up primitive survival fears. The individual's basic assumptions about the world
are shattered as he struggles with existential questions of purpose, mortality,
vulnerability, loneliness. In fact, the onset of chronic illness is so stressful that
Helgeson (1992) calls it a victimization experience. Because of their similarities, both
health and victimization will be considered in this section.
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Unexpected aversive events destroy our security in a just and predictable world.
Wolfenstein (1957) notes that a disaster victim loses "confidence in his luck" (p. 159)
fearing that now anything could happen. If an individual can regain a perception of
control over future events, Taylor (1983) states that he will be able to believe that
victimization is manageable or will not be repeated. Several authors have written that
perceived control may positively affect health by increasing coping efforts and
persistence, providing one with a positive self-image, and reducing distress (Bandura,
1977; Lefcourt, 1976; Thompson, 1981). The complex interaction of perceived control
and ill health appears to depend on the severity, duration and nature of the patient's
problems, as well as individual differences between patients and even their cultures.
The medical model has generally encouraged vicarious secondary control in
patients. We go to physicians to be healed, and we expect them to offer some
treatment (e.g., chemotherapy) or procedure (e.g., surgery) which will bring our
bodies back to health. Although illusions of control are generally adaptive (Taylor &
Brown, 1988), Taylor, Kemeny, Reed and Aspinwall (1991) suggest that those
illusions need to operate within realistic boundaries to be adaptive. When there is little
that can be done to cure a patient, as in the case of AIDS, a belief in vicarious control
can be maladaptive (Reed, 1989). If family members are used as objects of vicarious
control, males may exhibit distress. In a study of men with advanced heart disease
(Dracup, Guzy, Taylor and Barry, 1986), those whose wives had been trained in CPR
(and were thus capable of literally saving their husband's lives) were significantly
more anxious than those whose wives had not been trained.
Several studies have looked at the role of primary and secondary control
strategies in Types A and B personalities. Since Type A behavior has been shown to
lead to coronary heart disease (CHD), interventions for this group .are greatly needed.
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The characteristic of Type As which Powell (1992) calls the "pathogenic core" is
hostility, which is a stronger predictor of CHD than the Type A personality itself. The
picture of Type As which emerges from the literature is characterized by mistrust.
(Williams & Barefoot, 1988). Time urgency, excess drive, anger, impatience,
passivity and depression were seen by Glass (1977) as signs that Type As were
striving for control in the face of a challenging, and often unmalleable, environment.
Price (1982) hypothesized that their hostility comes from the belief that life is unjust
and chaotic, and their competitiveness from the belief one has to fight to get one's fair
share of limited resources. Aggression, vengeance, low self-esteem and low perceived
control are also important factors in the Type A makeup (Glass, 1977; Friedman &
Ulmer, 1984).
When Type A college students were compared to Type B students, Blackburn
(1984) found that Type Bs valued primary control as much as As did. The difference
seemed to be that Bs showed a greater preference for secondary control. Kenney
(1987) found that Type As know about but do not use secondary control strategies in
an adaptive, efficacious, and situationally appropriate manner. He agrees that As tend
to try to control situations that are uncontrollable to a greater extent than Bs, and that
Bs conversely are more likely to accept uncontrollable situations, frequently finding a
way to avoid disappointment or to reinterpret the situation more positively, perhaps as
bad luck (illusory secondary control). He also found, however, that As evidenced a
significant use of secondary control.
Brunson & Matthews (1981) found that when faced with a failure event, Type
Bs attributed that failure to situational factors and disengaged from the task, but Type
As attributed failure to dispositional factors and tried harder. This supports Powell's
(1992) finding that Type As blame the environment for problems, but believe that the
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environment can always be changed with persistence. Neibuhr's (1943) Serenity
Prayer seems to have been especially written for Type As, "God grant me the courage
to change what can be changed, serenity to accept what can't be changed, and wisdom
to know the difference." In other words, "Help me know when to use primary or
secondary control."
Blackburn (1984) states that high hostility individuals, which would include
most Type As, seem to prefer primary control more than low hostility individuals:
It seems that an impatient, competitive person with an internal locus of control
overly biased toward the exercise of primary control, and who was relatively
unable to utilize secondary control, would naturally tend to be aggressive and
hostile to the extent that desires for control were frustrated. From what we know
of Type A, this composite psychological/behavior profile would seem to
maximize the person's feeling of being at odds with the environment (including
other people). The result would then be a tendency to experience the chronic
stress that may be a factor in CHD development. (p. 94)
Powell (1992) followed 591 post-myocardial infarction patients for 4.5 years as
they were counseled regarding their basic attitude about the world. She encouraged
both a belief in reciprocal determinism, which de-emphasizes blame and considers
causes of problems from multiple perspectives, and a related belief that trying harder
or longer will not always lead to desired results. Using cognitive restructuring
interventions, Powell taught these patients to diminish their reactivity to minor
stressors:
We suggest to patients that these minor stressors are "hooks" and they are like
fish swimming past as many as 30 hooks each day, each of which are inviting
them to bite (i.e., to lose their tempers and become angry, impatient or irritated).
We then invite patients to recognize "the hook" - that is, to switch the
immediate perception of the stressor from "Unfair!" (which is accompanied by
irritation or impatience) to "Hook!" (which is frequently accompanied by
amusement.) In short, we seek a switch from primary to secondary control, that
is, predictive secondary control in that they know in advance it is coming, even
though they can't know exactly when. (p. 137)
As her subjects improved at identifying "hooks" they reported greater feelings of
self-control and self-efficacy. Powell's goal was to teach them versatility in choosing
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between primary and secondary control strategies. Her CHO patients were also taught
more effective primary control strategies which were not accompanied by as much
emotional arousal as their past methods. The physiological results of Powell's study
add an important dimension to our understanding of the two-process model:
The use of secondary control may exert the same beneficial effects on
physiology as those obtained by primary control. Direct primary control over
pain has been associated with an increase in endogenous opioids (Bandura,
O'Leary, Taylor, Gauthier & Gossard, 1987). But increased endogenous opioids
also resulted from the use of vicarious secondary control which presumably was
operating when subjects ingested a placebo painkiller (Grevert & Goldstein,
1985). (p. 135)
In a study of chronic pain sufferers, Mendola (1990) found that as the duration
of the individual's pain increased, primary control appraisals were no longer
beneficial. Related to this hypothesis is research which has found that, with increases
in severity of the stressor, the adaptive value of primary control decreases (Affleck,
Tennen, Pfeiffer, & Fifield, 1987). Severity of stressor may affect the effectiveness of
secondary control as well. Mendola (1990) found predictive control was associated
with more global psychological distress when his sample of chronic pain sufferers
rated the severity of the pain as low and less at high levels of pain severity. In another
study of coronary heart disease patients, Helgeson (1992) found that perceptions of
vicarious control were related to better adjustment only for patients who had
undergone invasive procedures by physicians. She states that perceived control will be
most adaptive when the outcome is controllable and the threat is severe.
Perhaps the most useful secondary control strategy for impaired health or bodily
functioning is the derivation of meaning from the stressor, interpretive control. A
growing body of research has documented the benefits that individuals construe from
major medical problems (e.g., Affleck, Tennen, Crog & Levine, 1987; Affleck,
Tennen & Gershman, 1985; Taylor, Collins, Skokan & Aspinwall, 1989; Tennen, et
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al., 1991; Affleck, Pfeiffer, Tennen & Fifield, 1988). Construing benefits has been
associated with emotional well-being among breast cancer patients (Taylor, Lichtman
& Wood, 1984), mothers of seriously ill infants (Affleck, Allen, Tennen, McGrade &

Ratzan, 1985) and infertile women (Tennen, Affleck & Mendola, 1991). Affleck,
Tennen, Croog & Levine (1987) found that heart attack victims who derived benefits
from their illness were less likely to have a subsequent heart attack over an eight-year
period, and Affleck, Tennen, and Rowe (1991) reported that mothers who found
benefits in their child's hospitalization on a newborn intensive care unit had children
who developed more optimally two years later. Some common themes include that the
illness strengthened family relationships and led to increased patience, tolerance,
empathy, and courage as well as changes in values and priorities.
Perloff (1983) suggests that before a serious health or victimization event occurs
to us, most of us operate under an illusion of invulnerability, which may be similar to
illusions of control. She suggests that illusions of unique invulnerability, the feeling
that "it can't happen to me," may benefit nonvictims by keeping feelings of anxiety at
a manageable level, promoting feelings of personal control, and allowing them to
carry out everyday activities without being hypervigilant and eternally "on guard."
Unfortunately, such illusions may also discourage us from taking adequate
precautions such as wearing seat belts or not smoking, and make coping even more
difficult after aversive events. According to Waister (1966), people do not want to
believe that severe negative outcomes can happen randomly, since such a belief forces
them to concede that an accident or misfortune could happen to them. To avoid facing
such a frightening thought, nonvictims will often blame the victim and convince
themselves that they are somehow different from, and more capable than, the victim
(Perloff, 1983).
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Silver, Boon & Stones (1983) state that finding meaning in the case of incest,
where the victim is chronically abused and powerless, or in situations which are
judged to be particularly unfair, may be especially difficult. Some victims of rape
react by "living dangerously" (Scheppele and Bart, 1983) which Peterson & Seligman
(1983) suppose may be an attempt at secondary control. Seeking meaning in isolation
may be especially challenging as in being the victim of socially unacceptable behavior
(incest, rape, death of loved one by suicide). Silver et al. studied 77 women whose
incest had terminated an average of 20 years previously. They found that if, after an
extended period, the search for meaning fails to bring understanding, continuing the
process of searching and repeatedly ruminating appears to be maladaptive. The
women who had been able to make sense of their experience reported less
psychological distress, more self-esteem, better social adjustment and greater
resolution of the experience than the women who were still searching for meaning.
The research of Witenberg, Blanchard, Suls, Tennen, McCoy & McGoldrick
(1983) and Tennan et al. (1984), suggests that finding meaning in a chronic medical
illness leads to better coping and compliance with treatment. Experimenters frequently
ask individuals who have experienced an aversive event if they have asked themselves
"Why me?" If they have, it would seem likely that they were attempting to use
interpretive secondary control. Affleck, Tennen & Gershman (1985) asked 42 mothers
of high risk infants if they had asked themselves, "Why me?" The majority of parents
had appraised the crisis as purposeful or gainful which the authors surmise helped
them maintain self-esteem. Affleck et al. note that:
This finding supports the hypothesis that the decline of repetitive, intrusive
thoughts about a stressful experience occurs as victims rebuild basic
assumptions about themselves and the world: the belief in relative
invulnerability, the conviction of mastery over the environment, and the view of
the world as meaningful and understandable (Janoff-Bulman & Frieze, 1983;
Perloff, 1983). (p. 655)

51
In a related study, Affleck et al. ( 1985) discovered that of 34 mothers of children
with insulin dependent diabetes, approximately 85% said they had asked themselves
the question "Why me?" and most had come up with an answer. Most of those
answers involved combinations of other secondary control strategies with interpretive
control. The authors divided the answers as follows:
1. God's wilVfate (e.g., "God must have a reason for this to happen" [vicarious
control]; "Things were going so well in our life that this just seems to have been
destined to happen to us" [illusory control])
2. punishment (e.g., "I stopped going to church after I was married" [vicarious
control])
3. selection (e.g., "I guess I was selected to have this happen to my child
[vicarious control]; I'm the type that can handle something like this"). (p. 371)

Nearly two-thirds of these mothers said there were benefits to having a child
with diabetes such as emotional growth, improved family health habits, closer bonds
within the family and deeper compassion for others.
In a study of 65 women with impaired fertility, Mendola, Tennen, Affleck,
McCann & Fitzgerald (1990), found that believing that the struggle to conceive had
strengthened one's marriage, and attributing the failure to biomedical causes, each
made an independent contribution to psychological symptoms. The conceptual
distinctions among primary control, secondary control, and causal attributions would
seem to be supported with causal attributions reflecting primary and secondary control
strategies at times. Causal ascriptions brought meaning to misfortune, thereby
promoting interpretive control. The answers people come up with for "Why me?" help
them to restore their belief in an orderly, purposeful existence. Mendola et al. (1990)
state that " ... threat appraisal, secondary control strategies, and causal beliefs each play
a pivotal role in people's psychological response to threatening events" (p. 91).
The findings from Affleck et al.'s (1987) study of patients with rheumatoid
arthritis emphasize the need to distinguish which aspects of chronic illnesses are
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subject to the patient's control in making predictions about the adaptive significance
of control appraisals in a chronic disease. The subjects in this study reported they felt
more in control of their symptoms but their physician had more control over the
course of their disease (See also Miller, 1980). Living with a serious chronic illness
involves attempting to balance our need to maintain a sense of mastery over our lives
with the perceived need to surrender treatment of our disease to health care providers
(Reid, 1984). In other words, balancing primary and secondary control processes
encourages both action and acceptance.
When patients feel that they have lost control of their physical health, and that
they cannot fully trust their health care providers, they frequently resort to covert
strategies to regain that control. Montbriand and Laing (1991) state that
noncompliance with health care directives may be an attempt by patients to regain
control of their own disorder. The authors also report that in their Canadian subjects,
89% (67 out of 75) of the informants were using alternative health care. None of the
subjects had informed their physicians they were using alternative health care. Most of
the patients chose a physical alternative such as an acupuncturist, chiropractor, or
vitamin supplements. Those who chose to use spiritual alternative care evoked a
cosmic source which was usually but not always God or a saint. Psychological
processes of alternative care included visualization techniques, self-distraction, and
attitudinal change. Although coveting taking back control, some of the patients
immediately gave that control away to an alternative practitioner.
Montbriand and Liang (1991) caution biomedical professionals to question their
belief that they are responsible for and in control of their patients' health care. Patients
who seem compliant may actually be covertly working with alternative methods.
Besides the finding that patients frequently take back control in this way, the authors
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state that all health care appears to be susceptible to the forces of chance. They add
that believing that anyone can control a health-care action is an instance of illusory
control used to deny the chance nature of healing.

Culture and Reli~ion
Spiritual faith, in all its many forms, is also frequently associated with both
vicarious and interpretive secondary control. Thompson and Spacapan (1991) state
that for many subgroups in Western societies undergoing major life stresses, the
choice between attempting to change a situation or adjusting to it is a central concern.
They cite religious involvement of African Americans as an example of secondary
control processes which are used to lessen stress and impart a sense of mastery and
self-esteem. Meyerowitz (1980) sampled strongly Catholic working class subjects
finding that they frequently attributed cancer to God's will, but Taylor et al. (1984)
found that a predominantly Jewish, upper middle class sample rarely did.
In a study of adolescent cancer patients, Tebbi, Mallon, Richards, and Bigler,

(1987) suggest the following:
... religion provides a valuable source of support for many patients, providing a
meaningful interpretation of existence and giving life a purpose which it might
not otherwise have. The belief that religion can provide security in the face of
death, endorsed by a majority of these patients, is in accord with data from
previous investigations of advanced cancer patients (Gibbs & AchterbergLawlis, 1978; Yates, Chalmer, St. James, Follansbee & McKegney, 1981) that
showed less fear of death and greater life satisfaction in more religious patients.
(p. 694)
The majority of adolescent patients in this study practiced their religion which
helped them understand and accept their experience as part of a divine plan and to find
some measure of security in the face of death. Over two-thirds said that they relied on
a supreme being to control what they could not. Spilk:a and Bridges (1989) posit that
prayer as a mechanism of secondary control helps the individual to feel more capable
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which results in a change in the self. Coming to terms with life as the medium of both
good and bad experiences by using secondary control strategies "lessens the weight of
life's tragedies" (p. 349). Gibbs and Achterberg-Lawlis (1978) found that the adult
terminal cancer patients they studied whose religion was a "powerful sustaining force"
for them reported less conscious fear of death, less death imagery, less difficulty
sleeping and a greater willingness to accept social support.
Gotay (1984) interviewed 112 female cancer patients and their mates. She found
that patients with the most advanced disease were more likely to share their fears not
only with other people but with their God. According to Gotay, religion may become
more important over the course of an illness as death nears.
The importance of religious faith in other cultures gives us fascinating glimpses
into the ways control is perceived in other countries. For instance, Dalal & Pande,
(1988), explain that in Hinduism the principle of KARMA is widely accepted as an
explanation for many tragic happenings in life:
In Hindu culture particularly, belief in the principle of KARMA implies that
good and bad deeds accumulate over all previous lives and if someone is
suffering, he or she must have done some wrong in the previous lives. As
interpreted by Parajpe (1984), the principle of KARMA is based on
determinism, that all human behavior is lawful and no one can escape
experiences of joy or suffering as the consequences of his own past deeds. This
principle not only restores one's faith injustice but also provides a very
convincing and socially acceptable explanation for the event. (p. 27)
Permanently disabled patients in this study were found less motivated to search
for the causes of the tragic event and attributed the accident more to external factors
than those who were temporarily disabled. Chance and God's will were the causes
most frequently mentioned and attributions to KARMA and God's will were
significantly correlated with psychological recovery.
Dalal and Pande explain that belief in the principle of KARMA is all pervasive
among Hindus. Karma explains all of life's vicissitudes and reinforces the Hindu's
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faith in a just world. Desire to control the environment is inhibited in Hindus in favor
of controlling their emotions (Ruback and Pandey, 1991). Other sections of the Indian
population including the poor (Sinha, Jain & Pandey, 1980), the disadvantaged (Misra
and Misra, 1986) and the depressed (Jain, 1987) have also been found to frequently
make attributions to God's will and chance. When the outcome is temporary and
controllable, Hindus appear to prefer primary control, but when confronted with a
permanent, unmodifiable outcome, they generally depend on illusory or vicarious
control (Dalal & Pande, 1988).
The most exhaustive, although merely exploratory, study of cultural differences
in the use of primary and secondary control was done by Weisz, Rothbaum &
Blackburn (1984). These authors contrasted Japanese and American perspectives and
practices in child rearing, socialization, religion and philosophy, work and
psychotherapy. The only area Weisz and his colleagues found that Japanese seem to
emphasize primary control is in those situations which involve pressure to achieve,
especially academically. Otherwise, secondary control appears to be the primary mode
of control for the Japanese.
Weisz and his colleagues looked at Zen Buddhism as a representative religion in
Japan. In Zen Buddhism the worshiper attempts to purge himself of desire in the
pursuit of bliss or enlightenment. With enlightenment, Buddhists no longer seek to
change even tragic realities; instead they reinterpret and reorient to them as in
interpretive secondary control. Kojima (1984) notes that, for Japanese, there is no
separation between the self and the environment. It is the relationship between the two
rather than the control of one over the other which Japanese seek to regulate.
Of course, all religions emphasize secondary control by providing purpose and
meaning, and by fostering obedience to, association with and protection by at least
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one deity. Christians historically have tempered their secondary control with a large
dose of primary control, however. They send out missionaries, wage wars, evangelize,
do good deeds and pray that God will alter reality as the supplicant wishes. In
contrast, Zen Buddhists peacefully accept things as they are, seeing good deeds as
hindrances to true insight (Noss, 1966).
Both vicarious and predictive secondary control can be seen in the Japanese
worker. Where Americans value the self-made man with his emphasis on primary
control, workers in Japan are more concerned with their company's success (Byron,
1981). When Japanese workers strive for primary control via a strike, they
symbolically stop work over a lunch hour or make up the time later so that they
maintain their vicarious secondary control. The Japanese have the security of
predictive and vicarious control in their clear status hierarchy, but it comes at the cost
of personal autonomy (Weisz et al., 1984).
Psychotherapy is even more different in the two cultures than business practices.
Most American psychotherapists work with their clients to alter symptoms or
problems. Japanese practitioners, on the other hand, consider a patient cured "when he
has stopped groping for means to relieve his symptoms" (Reynolds, 1980, p. 34).
Reynolds describes one of the main forms of therapy in Japan in the following:
Naikan "best elucidates the core values of the Japanese culture" (Lebra, 1976, p.
201). It involves continuous, carefully structured, solitary meditation, initially in
a small enclosed space, from early morning until late at night. Ideally, these
meditations provoke an emotionally intense "restructuring of the client's view of
his past ... along with a reassessment of this self-image and his current social
relationships." (p 47-48)
Naikan therapy appears to offer its clients interpretive secondary control by
providing meaning and purpose regardless of whether the patient's symptoms have
been eliminated.
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In a reply to Weisz et al., Azuma (1984) describes how he was socialized as a
Japanese to yield in order to control his assertive drives and protect the peace and
harmony of the group. He speaks of three different kinds of yielding: mature, selfcontrolled yielding; the yielding of being at peace with what fate has given one; and
yielding based on love and empathy. In another response to Weisz et al., Kojima
(1984) describes the Japanese art of indirectness:
For example, instead of giving advice directly to a person, we Japanese often ask
a third person to do so on our behalf. This indirect route is taken because we
believe that it is more effective and can avoid arousing unpleasant feelings that
often occur between the person giving advice and the one receiving it. Thus,
primary control is exerted in a manner that is socially acceptable. What may be
the difference between the Japanese and U.S. cultures is not only the ratio of
primary to secondary control, but also the nature of socially accepted modes of
primary control, that is, direct versus indirect. (p. 972)
Because secondary control processes are so integral to their culture, the Japanese
are more interested in finer discriminations between those processes. Weisz,
Rothbaum, and Blackburn (1984) relate the following illustration: "An American first
visiting a sushi bar may see raw fish on rice, whereas a Japanese may see a rich array
of delicacies, each differing from the others in subtle but very meaningful ways" (p.
974).
In a review of cultural differences in the concept of the self, Landrine (1992)
proposes that our differences are mostly in the meanings we attach to behavior rather
than in the behaviors themselves. She explains that in Western culture, since control is
understood in primary control terms, we are expected to act upon the world and others
in order to meet our needs, avoid punishment, and further our way of life. When we
fail to seek primary control we are labeled helpless, passive, unassertive and lacking
in self-efficacy, submissive, low in self-esteem, inadequate and depressed.
In contrast, Landrine lists the following sociocentric cultures: Asian-Americans,
Black-Americans, Native-Americans, Hindu-Americans, most White American
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women, and the vast majority of people around the world. In these cultures,
individuals are inseparable from their roles within the family, more concerned with
meeting the needs of their families and communities than their own.
In several cultures including Indonesian, Polynesian, some Asian, several
Southeast Asian and many Native-American, ancestors and other entities are thought
to dwell within individuals, using them as vessels. The Lohorung of East Nepal (see
Hardman, 1981), share entity-forces as a community, linking individuals to ancestors.
When a shared self has been away from any one person for too long, symptoms appear
in the individual. He is healed when the self is found and returned to him (Landrine,
1992).
The Balinese see the individual as "a receptacle within which several
supernatural forces interact as integral components of the individual's personality"
(Landrine, 1992, p. 410). The Balinese destroy anything unique to the individual, who
does not truly exist, in order to assure the immaterial beings, who are more real, are
presented in as pure a form as possible. Landrine (1992) explains:
(In sociocentric cultures,) the indexical self engages in secondary control: The
individual is changed, adjusted and acted on until he or she fits more
harmoniously within the family, relationship or community; or, the entire group
is changed to improve the quality of life of all of its members, rather than for
any individual. This radically different understanding of control can be
misinterpreted by Western clinicians as submissiveness, passivity and
helplessness and results in the frequent urge to provide assertiveness training, in
particular, for Asian-American clients. Increasing the secondary- not the
primary - control of all members of the relationship of relevance may be a more
culturally sensitive, appropriate and acceptable treatment goal. (p. 412)
Landrine cautions Western psychotherapists who may be tempted to diagnose
persons from other cultures as psychotic because they hear or see other entities, or
because of other experiences or thoughts which would reflect pathology in our culture,
that these persons may simply be reflecting their own cultures. She believes therapists
must be culturally sensitive to avoid interventions which may be harmful to these
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individuals. In their cultures autonomy cuts the self off from the community, resulting
in isolation and loneliness (Shweder & Bourne, 1982). Relinquishing primary control
leads to a sense of purpose, meaning, belonging and security in their families and
communities.
Earle (1986) applied the two process model to understanding the functioning of
entire nations. The prevailing strategy among nations has been to increase their power
with regard to potential adversaries. As each side develops more advanced
technologies, which eventually become available to even less stable third parties, the
peoples of those nations, whose own needs for control have been thwarted, resist the
actions of the politicians. Vietnam, the oil embargo, and the Iranian hostage crisis of
the 1970s (cf. Yankelovich, 1982) seriously impaired America's potency, leaving us
doubtful of our ability to exercise significant primary control in the international
arena. This had real consequences for domestic political priorities and foreign policy
actions. The countries of the former Soviet block have more recently had their own
problems with their ability to exercise primary control. Earle explains that, as a result,
the politicians began to depend heavily on interpretive control in the form of "rigidly
ideological beliefs about the nature of the 'other side' and the necessity of continued
struggle" (p. 372). This allows the politicians to reduce their differences down to a
struggle of "good" against "evil'', thereby maintaining a sense of order and
predictability. Earle states that this guarantees that the cycle will repeat itself and that
foreign policy will continue to be based on illusion and erroneous judgment. When the
people of a nation lose trust in their leaders, they will struggle to regain control over
those decisions and experiences which affect them and their loved ones. Nations must,
at some point, discontinue conceiving of control as a subject-object relationship, in
which the strongest nations are allowed to exercise primary control over an "object"
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(e.g., land, resources, subject populations). Instead power could be considered in the
context of a subject-subject relationship based on knowledge rather than illusion, "a
dynamic system in which control needs are realized by the exercise of mutual
influence" (Earle, 1986, p. 374).
Earle (1986) writes that, "In personal relations, 'success' requires a more subtle
appreciation of the ability to attain control by giving up control - i. e., by contributing
to the well-being of the other in ways that will reciprocally enhance both oneself and
the relationship" (p. 374).
Earle seems to be advocating that we might have something to learn from the
other cultures mentioned in this chapter. Control strategies in international relations,
however, have been firmly rooted in the Western business model which has had, not
surprisingly, similar problems. Rather than the communal nature of business favored
by the Japanese, in the United States the worker-management relationship is viewed
as adversarial (Kanungo, 1992). Individuals within the organization are separate,
autonomous and independent of one another in a win-lose battle for available
resources.

In a paper on the experience of powerlessness in organizations, Ashforth (1989)
writes that the usual managerial response to employee disruption, apathy or alienation
is to fortify the system of control. Ashforth contends that it is precisely because of the
employees' perceptions of lack of control or autonomy that much of this behavior
occurs. He recommends less control over these individuals instead of more:
Unfortunately, it is the irony of control systems that they tend to be selfvalidating: Compliance justifies the existing controls; noncompliance justifies
their extension. This circularity, of course, gives rise to a vicious circle of everincreasing control and deviance. (p. 235)
Kanungo (1992) recommends that managers begin to see themselves as a
"connected self," "part of an enduring relationship with a sense of community" (p.
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421) rather than isolated individuals interested in their own rights with regard to their
workers. This is necessary because when people perceive that their opportunities for
control have been blocked by their organizations, they will generally attempt to
reestablish that control. They may attempt direct primary control strategies such as
confronting the source of the problem or indirect primary control by decreasing
productivity (Greenberger and Strasser, 1986). If these methods fail, they may also
attempt to reduce ambiguity by exercising predictive secondary control. Greenberger
and Strasser (1986) note the following:
Secondary or indirect strategies (even when perceived nonveridically) are
particularly important in the organizational setting since control seekers so
frequently perceive themselves as unable to control outcomes directly. For
example, the denial of requests (increase in compensation, additional staff) is
most common in organizations. Short of helplessness, employees are forced to
rely on these secondary approaches to achieve some semblance of control
homeostasis. (p. 172-173)
It should be clear from this chapter that individuals who want control will find a
way to get it. Patients make use of various types of secondary control even when they
must do so covertly. The emphasis on primary control found in Western cultures is
very different from other cultures which value and utilize secondary control to a much
greater extent. The next chapter will include areas for future research on the two
process model as well as applications for the concept.

CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS

This paper has been an attempt to bring together what is known at this time
about Rothbaum, Weisz, and Snyder's (1982) two-process theory of primary and
secondary control. It should be apparent now that this is a concept worthy of
continued and vigorous study. Nevertheless, the discovery of the importance of this
concept should in no way discredit other control theories which have added
immensely to our understanding of how people behaviorally and cognitively respond
to their world. Chapter Two demonstrates that, lacking an overarching theory of
control processes, it appears that the two process model is often necessary to explain
inconsistencies in studies of other theories. In response to an article by Weisz (1990)
on the two process model, Rosenberg (1990) states the following:
One of the most impressive features of Weisz' research on the beliefs, goals
and styles of control is that it successfully integrates a broad range of
concepts - locus of control, self-efficacy, learned helplessness, mastery,
powerlessness, and so on - that have often been treated separately in the
literature. (p. 147)
Many would say that this concept is not well enough defined, that its research
has not been done with enough precision. This problem will not be easily overcome.
Macnamara, Govitrikar and Doan (1988) submit that it may be unworkable to
distinguish any causal laws in psychology that entail reference to a person's beliefs
and desires. It may be a very long time before our ability is sufficient to design
experiments to determine the composition of what Quine and Ullian (1978) call our
"web of belief." These authors suggest that our beliefs are all connected, interwoven
62
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strands will not reveal the intricate beauty or complexity of the structure, and altering
one or two strands without a knowledge of what may be maintaining them will not
substantially alter the web. Mark Twain, a common-sense psychologist, describes the
difficulty of knowing another's mind in the following:
What a wee little part of a person's life are his acts and his words! His real
life is led in his head, and is known to none but himself. All day long, the
mill of his brain is grinding, and his thoughts, not those other things, are his
history. These are his life, and they are not written, and cannot be written.
Every day would make a whole book of 80,000 words - 365 books a year.
Biographies are but the clothes and buttons of the man - the biography of
the man himself cannot be written.
Given the difficulty of ultimately fully understanding and being able to predict
when and how persons can and should attempt primary or secondary control (which
may be our need as researchers for interpretive and predictive control), how might we
go about the seemingly impossible? Thompson and Spacapan (1991) provide
something of a roadmap:
Guiding questions for any project should include the following: What aspect
of control - contingency or competence - is most relevant to the area under
study? Are measures of both global and specific aspects of control included,
and of primary and secondary control? How do the various dimensions of
control interact to affect outcomes? (p. 11)
It should not be surprising that Weisz (personal communication) has stated that
there are many more secondary control strategies that have not been labeled as such.
For example, Thompson (1985), in studying, immediately and after one year, people
whose homes were damaged in a fire, found five ways of focusing on the positive in
the face of an uncontrollable aversive event: finding side benefits, making social
comparisons, imagining worse situations, forgetting the negative, and redefining. She
found these cognitions to be fairly stable after a year. Those victims who did not use
the above secondary control strategies were devastated by the fire and remained so for
the year following. Those who did use them reported fewer symptoms and better

64

coping. Individuals who focused on the positive tended to use all five categories,
further illustrating the complexity of the web of belief metaphor.

Adaptive and Maladaptive Uses of the Model
Rothbaum, Weisz and Snyder (1982) define adaptiveness in terms of the relative
levels of primary and secondary control, with the ideal balance or sequence of primary
and secondary control varying from situation to situation. Much more work could be
done to study the two process model in different situations and balances. More work
like Thompson's needs to be done to determine whether secondary control beliefs
change over time in field settings where the events have real consequence for people's
lives. Interviews appear to be the best way to get at people's goals and intents for their
control choices, but Schulman, Castellon, and Seligman's (1989) Content Analysis of
Verbatim Explanations (CA VE) technique also shows substantial promise.
Peterson & Bossio (1991) describe unpublished studies done with J. Bryce, N.
Kirsch & K. Lachman. In the first study, using CAVEing, they examined the firstperson narratives of former American slaves who told their stories to interviewers
during the 1930s (Yetman, 1970). The experimenters found that the subjects who had
survived through slavery, with its loss of personal control, into old age, relied to a
great extent on secondary control processes. The second study CAVEed the written
interviews of a group of mothers struggling to raise their families in the stresses of
contemporary war-tom Beirut (Bryce, 1986). Both the slaves and the mothers in
Beirut used more secondary control strategies than two samples of contemporary
Americans.
Besides control over negative events, Bryant (1989) advocates studying
judgments of primary and secondary control in relation to positive events. He crossed
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primary-secondary control with positive-negative experience and developed a fourfactor model of perceived control consisting of self-evaluations of one's ability to:
(a) avoid negative events (primary-negative control) through primary
control; (b) cope with negative events (secondary-negative control); (c)
obtain positive events (primary-positive control); and (d) savor positive
events (secondary-positive control). (p. 775)
This four-factor model distinguished between perceived primary control (over
events) and perceived secondary control (over feelings) separately in relation to
positive and negative experiences. Bryant states that his model explains people's selfevaluations of control better than other conceptual models, and was fairly accurate in
predicting levels of subjective well-being and distress.
Chapter Four indicates that health care appears to be the most fruitful area for
application and future research at this time. Given the large numbers of patients who
covertly utilize alternative health care (Montbriand & Laing, 1991), it is clear that we
are not as trusting of the physician's ability to heal us as we once were. Doan and
Gray (1992) call the cancer patient who adopts a proactive stance toward his illness
(e.g., using imagery as in the Simontons' (1978) Getting Well Again, or expressive,
intuitive techniques from Bernie Siegel's (1986) Love, Medicine and Miracles or
(1989) Peace, Love and Healing) the Heroic Cancer Patient. These patients appear to
feel better and be better adjusted (Derogatis, 1986, Seeman & Seeman, 1983, Taylor,
1983), although there is only equivocal evidence that these techniques can prevent or
halt cancer (see Cunningham, 1985; Fox, 1983; Spiegel, Bloom & Kraemer, 1989).
Doan and Gray voice concern that some patients who adopt the heroic stance are even
more shattered than they would have been if their illness recurs or if they are not able
to halt its progress. These authors posit that illusion may be preferable when the future
is uncertain, as in cancers with unpredictable courses. At these times, the heroic stance
towards cancer could provide many patients with "security, a sense of personal
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control, and a way of enduring hardships associated with the illness and its treatment"
(p. 263).
Taylor et al. (1991) contend that trusting physicians to heal us may be adaptive
as long as symptoms are not severe. With more serious conditions, belief in vicarious
control becomes less adaptive. Trillin (1981), a cancer patient herself, has this to say:
So, once we have recognized the limitations of the magic of doctors and
medicine, where are we? We have to tum to our own magic, to our ability to
"control" our bodies. For people who don't have cancer, this often takes the
form of jogging and exotic diets and transcendental meditation. For people
who have cancer, it takes the form of conscious development of the will to
live. (p. 700)
Taylor et al. (1991) submit that it is important for professionals to support the
patient's perception of control and autonomy while at the same time encouraging her
to prepare for all eventualities. These authors state that:
It will be important for future research to explore the boundaries of both
personal and vicarious control, and for future work to illuminate more fully
the circumstances under which each form of control may contribute to or
detract from psychological adjustment. (p.107)
It is difficult to conceive of areas where an understanding of the two process
model would not be helpful. At the Chicago Blues Festival one year a blind musician
listening to another performer shouted with joy, "I knew that was going to happen! I
knew that was going to happen!" To him, being able to predict the notes was his
measure of mastery. From there, it is a short distance to literary criticism, management
training, race relations, and even sports. Reser & Scherl (1988) discuss flow
experiences, which happen at times during physical competitions or wilderness
outings, as being typified by an awareness of being "a distinct yet integral part of the
ongoing transaction, and a sense of oneness with what one is doing" (p. 272). This
language sounds very much like descriptions of the Japanese culture in the previous
chapter. The authors continue with the following:
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The quality of feedback and consequent sense of oneness-with-activity
found in flow situations allows for self-control options relating to emotional
response (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984), and predictive and interpretive
control (Rothbaum et al., 1982).

Mental Health Applications

In mental health, the two process model gives practitioners a tool to use with
many different populations. White & Janson (1986) suggest that interventions with
those who are institutionalized in highly constraining environments, such as those
mentioned in Chapter Three, not focus on ways of enhancing primary control, which
is seriously limited, but secondary control, which would be more realistic in the
situation. Rothbaum et al. (1982) suggest that it might be useful to match therapeutic
methods to clients along the primary and secondary control dimensions.
Taylor and Brown (1988) challenge the traditional notion that therapy involves
helping the client view himself and his circumstances more realistically. Positive
illusions of control are both functional and adaptive according to them, especially in
aversive circumstances. Doan and Gray (1992) prefer working toward an optimal
balance of illusion and reality, but admit that knowing where that balance is from
moment to moment will be challenging.
Considering that people will go to extreme lengths to retain some semblance of
control over their lives, it behooves therapists to understand all they can about those
processes. Rezek & Leary (1991) note that "individuals with anorexic tendencies react
to low perceived control by restricting food intake as a means of regaining a sense of
control" (p. 129), because eating is one of the few things in their lives that others
cannot control (Bruch, 1978). The self-restricted eating is a form of "displaced
reactance" which substitutes for a lack of control in other areas of the individual's life.
The authors propose that anorexia may be a kind of secondary control. Other mental

68
health concerns which have been studied embracing the two process model as a factor
include schizophrenia in Switzerland (Dauwalder, 1988), nightmares (Cook, Caplan &
Wolowitz, 1990), dread rumors (Walker & Blaine, 1991) and bereavement (Wortman
and Silver, 1989).
Much more could be learned about how other cultures view primary and
secondary control. We may find that we are the culture which values secondary
control strategies the least! A good beginning is being made by Trommsdorff (1991)
who studied German mothers to determine if those who were more empathetic with
their children would have children with higher empathy. She states that:
Especially the mother's effort to experience vicariously the child's needs an essential aspect of secondary (in contrast to primary) control orientation
seems to be an important factor in the development of empathy. Therefore,
we are presently studying the effects of growing up with a belief system of
primary vs. secondary control orientation in different cultures. (p. 390)
In studying instruction in universities, Perry & Penner (1990) found that
expressive instructors elicit selective attention. They also advocate well-organized
lectures in which predictive secondary control would presumably be easier to attempt.

Future Research
More work on understanding the development of primary and secondary control
processes through the life span and gender differences in the use of the model would
seem to be warranted. Individual as well as group differences in primary and
secondary control use will surely produce interesting data. For instance, Heath (1986)
noted that her sample of incarcerated criminals showed a preference for and belief in
their ability to exercise primary control despite their confinement. Further research
should distinguish between control by powerful others who are concerned with one's
welfare as compared to those who are not, such as prison guards or political dictators.
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To summarize, much more research needs to be done on primary and secondary
control in several areas. There are several more secondary control strategies to name
and define. It seems clear that individuals use both primary and secondary control
strategies in a myriad of adaptive and maladaptive ways, many of which have been
discussed above. The use of primary and secondary control strategies do change with
development, across cultures, and to a much lesser extent by gender. Research on this
rich concept, as on any belief, will be difficult and less precise than we might like;
however there appears to be little doubt that the two process model is an important
concept which deserves a central role in any study of control theory.
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